COMMENTS
THE EPA'S POWER TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL
EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS FOR EXISTING
WATER POLLUTION SOURCES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
19721 fundamentally restructured the national water pollution
control effort. A controversial aspect of the Amendments, which
this Comment will explore, is the nature of federal regulatory
2
power over the discharges of existing industrial point sources.
The Amendments established a national goal of eliminating
the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.' This
goal is to be accomplished in two steps through the application
of successively stricter control measures: by mid-1977, the level
of effluent discharge from most existing sources shall not be
permitted to exceed the amount produced after utilization of the
"best practicable control technology currently available"; 4 by
mid-1983, the level of effluent discharge is to be limited further
by the application of the "best available technology economically
achievable."'5 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
charged with the task of defining these levels of technology for
distinct categories of industrial point sources by promulgating
"guidelines for effluent limitations."'6 The resulting standards of
technology are major determinants of the extent of pollutant
discharge that will be allowed for sources within a particular
industrial category, without regard to the condition of the body
of water into which the discharge is released.
I Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 101-518, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (Supp.
IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
2 The term "existing point source" is not defined in the Act. A "new source" under
the Act is generally a pollutant-discharging facility, construction of which began after
the publication date of the relevant "standard of performance." Id. §§ 306 (a)(1)-(5), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1316(a)(l)-(5) (Supp. IV, 1974). As used in this Comment, the term "existing
point source" refers to an industrial source operated or on which construction began
prior to the publication of the relevant regulations under the 1972 Amendments.
3Id. § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
4Id. § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
5
d. § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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Existing industrial facilities may be subject to additional
standards that restrict pollutant discharge. These include effluent limitations derived from measures of the quality of the
receiving body of water (water quality criteria).7 The total allowable effluent discharge for a particular source subject to one or
more of these control standards is defined by a permit system,8
administered by those states that satisfy certain EPA requirements9 or, alternatively, administered directly by the EPA. In
general, all facilities discharging pollutants into navigable waters
must obtain a permit that certifies that the facility complies with
the effluent levels and water quality standards applicable to the
particular plant.' 0
The EPA has issued water pollution control regulations"
for the twenty-seven major industrial categories identified by the
Act, 1 2 as well as for hundreds of subcategories thereunder. Significantly, these regulations include "effluent limitations guidelines,"'13 which purport to set the maximum allowable effluent
level 4 for all existing point sources 1 5 discharging into the waters
i Under certain conditions, water-quality-related effluent limitations may be established by the EPA or by the states, subject to EPA approval. Id. §§ 302-03, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1312-13 (Supp. IV, 1974).
8Id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. IV, 1974). The permit system--the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)-is supervised by the EPA. Id.
9 Pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 304(h)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974), the EPA has promulgated requirements for states wishing to obtain permit-issuing authority under the national permit program. If the EPA is
satisfied that adequate state authority exists to ensure compliance with national requirements for pollutant reduction, control, and monitoring, it then approves the particular state's permit-issuing program. Id. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. IV,
1974); see note 64 infra & accompanying text.
10 Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 402(a)(1), (3), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), (3)
(Supp. IV, 1974); see text accompanying notes 62-63 infra.
1i 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-32 (1975).
12 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 306(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A)
(Supp. IV, 1974). These industries are: pulp and paper. mills; paperboard, builders
paper and board mills; meat product and rendering processing; diary product processing; grain mills; canned and preserved fruits and vegetables processing; canned and
preserved seafood processing; sugar processing; textile mills; cement manufacturing;
feedlots; electroplating; organic chemicals manufacturing; inorganic chemicals manufacturing; plastic and synthetic materials manufacturing; soap and detergent manufacturing; fertilizer manufacturing; petroleum refining; iron and steel manufacturing; nonferrous metals manufacturing; phosphate manufacturing; steam electric powerplants;
ferroalloy manufacturing; leather tanning and finishing; glass and asbestos manufacturing; rubber processing; timber products processing. Id.
13 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-32 (1975).
14 As indicated previously, the final allowable discharge level specified in the permit
may be lower than the level set by technology-based effluent limitations due to water
quality criteria. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
15 A point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, con-
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of the United States.1 6 The EPA's effluent limitations guidelines
purport to apply directly to each such point source by establishing a fixed numerical value for effluent discharge by all point
sources within a given subcategory,1 7 without regard to their
individual characteristics. Although the Amendments explicitly
authorize the EPA to promulgate "standards of performance"
for new (unconstructed or newly renovated) point source polluters,' 8 neither the language nor the legislative history of the
Amendments provides clear authority for direct EPA controlrather than state control through the permit process described
earlier-over existing sources. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit formulated the issue in this way:
[T]he only section explicitly authorizing the Administrator to establish any regulations pertaining to effluent
standards for existing point sources-section 304(b)merely authorizes the promulgation of "guidelines"
rather than precise standards or single number limitations. While section 301(b) refers to "effluent limitations" for existing point sources, that section does not
explicitly authorize the Administrator (or anyone else)
to promulgate regulations establishing such limitations.
Rather, using the passive voice, that section merely
states that effluent limitations for such point sources
"shall be achieved" by July 1, 1977 through the application of the "best practicable control technology currently available" . . . and by July 1, 1983 through the
application of the "best available technology economitainer, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. IV, 1974).
16 The Act prohibits or otherwise restricts the "discharge of any pollutant," id.
§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), defined as, inter alia, "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." Id. § 502(12)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). The term "navigable waters" is defined in the Act as
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas," id. § 502(7), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7) (Supp. IV, 1974), which on its face is a broader definition than the traditional
concept of "navigable waters." For a discussion of the scope of this term, see Zener, The
Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682, 687-93 (1974).
17 Due to the breadth of the categories, see note 12 supra, the EPA must define
subcategories of each industry that share similar characteristics such as products or processes. Standards are then applied to all factories or facilities within a subcategory.
Further distinctions within a subcategory are sometimes made and narrower standards
applied. See 40 C.F.R. §§405-32 (1975).
"8Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
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cally achievable".... Under petitioners' construction of
the Act, these effluent limitations are to be "achieved"
through the permit process. They contend that the
permit issuing authorities, under section 402, are to determine the effluent limitations to be achieved by applying, to individual point sources, the factors enumerated
in the guidelines previously promulgated by the Administrator under section 304(b). I9
The EPA's statutory authority to establish directly national
effluent limitations for categories of existing point sources has
increasingly been the focus of litigation, and seven circuit courts
of appeals 20 have addressed the question to date. The question
is as difficult as it is important. The greater the power conferred
upon the EPA the less is the discretion available to state permitissuing agencies to relax standards for particular industrial dischargers in order to further nonenvironmental goals. On the
other hand, national effluent limitation regulations even if carefully drawn may fail to reflect special circumstances affecting individual point sources or communities, although the regulations
may clearly promote national environmental objectives. In short,
the issue is the distribution of authority between the state and
national governments. It may be due to the sensitivity of this
issue that Congress left key provisions of the Amendments ambiguous, intentionally shifting the decision to the EPA and ultimately to the courts. 2 '
For a full understanding of the complexity of the 1972
Amendments, a brief review of the congressional labors that led
to the enactment of the Amendments is necessary, and is undertaken in Part II of this Comment. 22 Part II will also examine
19American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
20 American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1465 (10th Cir., Aug. 11, 1976);
American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976); Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1687 (2d Cir., Apr. 28, 1976); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 (4th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
3165 (1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); CPC Int'l, Inc.
v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d
1027 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
709-10 & n.101 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum).
21The ambiguity of the Act is discussed throughout this Comment. Its origins in
the legislative process are discussed in text accompanying notes 28-39 infra; the Act's
internal ambiguities are explored in text accompanying notes 93-225 infra in the context of the consistency of national effluent limitations with the general scheme of the
Act, with the permit process, and with the Act's balance of state control and national
uniformity.
22
See text accompanying notes 28-39 infra.
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some of the interrelationships among important provisions of
the Amendments.2 3 Part III will examine whether under the
Amendments jurisdiction to review the EPA's establishment of
national effluent limitations lies in the circuit courts of appeals
or in the district courts. 2 4 Statutory ambiguity will be resolved
through resort to legislative history and to the policies thought to
underlie the Amendments. Part IV will consider whether the
national effluent limitations as interpreted by the EPA and by
the courts are consistent with the fundamental processes and
policies of the Amendments. Specifically, consideration will be
given to whether EPA-established national effluent limitations
are consistent with the overall scheme of the Amendments,25
with the permit procedures, 6 and with the intended balance of
state control and national uniformity under the Amendments.2 7
II.

THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

ACT'S EFFLUENT CONTROL POLICY

A. The Legislative Process
The controversy regarding the EPA's authority to establish
national effluent limitations for existing point sources surrounds
a statute that is as opaque as it is ambitious. Because the final
form of the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act represented a compromise between versions supported with equal fervor by the Senate and the House, it may be
helpful to review briefly the legislative process that shaped the
law.
The Senate Committee on Public Works initially formulated
a bill 2 8 that detailed a thoroughgoing federal effort to control

water pollution through the imposition of effluent limitations on
all significant point sources. 2 9 This bill passed the Senate,
eighty-six to zero, on November 2, 1971.30
23 See text accompanying notes 50-66 infra.

24 See text accompanying notes 67-92 infra.
25 See text accompanying notes 155-72 infra.

26 See text accompanying notes 155-68 infra.
27 See text accompanying notes 173-225 infra.

28 S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
29 SENATE COMM.

AMENDMENTS

ON PUBLIC WORKS,

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACr

OF 1971, S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong.,

[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in

1st Sess. 41-75 (1971)

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION OF

THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 93D CONG., 1ST
SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF

1972 1415, 1459-93 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

30 117 CONG. REC. 38865 (1971).
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Four months later, the House passed a bill3 ' that amended
and weakened significantly the Senate version. 32 This retrenchment was due in part to an environmental backlash fueled by
pressures from the Nixon Administration, which was concerned
with the costs of environmental protection. 3 The House passed
this weaker bill on March 29, 1972, by a vote of 380 to four4
teen.

3

The differences between the Senate and House versions
were so great that the Conference Committee had to meet
thirty-nine times over a period of five months to achieve a compromise.3 5 The Conference Committee reported on September
28, 1972, with a comparatively sketchy description of the intent
behind the compromise provisions. 36 The Conference Report is
particularly unilluminating with regard to the provisions on effluent limitations and the national permit system. The Conference
Report was adopted by wide margins in both houses. 37 A veto by
former President Nixon3 8 met a thundering override within
twenty-four hours on October 18, 1972, 3 9 whereupon Congress
adjourned for the elections.
B. A New Regulatory Philosophy
The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act shifted the mode of water pollution control from water
quality criteria to technology-based effluent limitations. 40 Under
the previous system,4 ' federal water quality standards applied to
31 H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
32

HOUSE COMM.

ON

POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 100-30 (1972)
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at

PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER

AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 92-911,

[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT],
753, 787-817.
33 For a discussion of the process in the House, see Note, The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972: Ambiguity as a Control Device, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 565, 568-71 (1973).
34 118 CONG. REc. 10803-04 (1972).
35 118 CONG. REC. 33692 (1972) (remarks of Senator Muskie), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 161.
36 COMMITrEE

OF

CONFERENCE,

FEDERAL

WATER

POLLUTION

CONTROL

ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as CONFERENCE REPORT], reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 281.
37 118 CONG. REc. 33718 (Senate vote of 74 to 0); id. 33767 (House vote of 366 to

11).

38 8 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1531 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 29, at 137.
11 118 CONG. REC. 36879 (Senate vote of 52 to 12); id. 37060-61 (House vote of 247
to 23).

40 Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 301(b), 304(b), 33 U.S.C. §§1311(b),
1314(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
41 The details of the pre-1972 federal water pollution control efforts are beyond
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interstate waters while state standards applied to intrastate waters; primary enforcement and monitoring responsibilities rested
with the states.4 2 The federal and state water quality criteria
reflected the pollution-carrying capacities of each body of navigable water. The relevant measurements were the concentrations
of pollutants in the water rather than at the point of discharge
itself. An implicit premise was that streams and lakes were
proper repositories for fixed levels of pollutants even if it was
technologically feasible to reduce the discharge from a particular
source.
Water quality criteria proved unsatisfactory because they
were virtually unenforceable. 43 Where multiple sources discharged pollutants, responsibility for degradation was difficult
weak comproto establish, and remedies were often necessarily
44
mises following a tedious conference process.
Effluent controls, by contrast, apply to the discharge at each
point source. 45 Effluent limitations vary with the product being
produced and the production process. The strictness of the
criteria depends largely upon economic and technological aspects of the particular industry. The adoption by Congress of
effluent limitations reflects a new regulatory philosophy, as expressed in the Senate Report:
This section [301] clearly establishes that the discharge
of pollutants is unlawful. Unlike its predecessor program which permitted the discharge of certain amounts
of pollutants under the conditions described above, this
legislation would clearly establish that no one has the
right to pollute-that pollution continues because of
technological limits, not because of any inherent right to

the scope of this Comment. For discussions of this subject, see J. DAVIES, THE POLITICS
OF POLLUTION ch. 2 (1970); Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisionsof the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1103 (1970); Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A
Second Chancefor Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1971); Comment, The Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Effective Controls at Last?, 39 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 403 (1972).
42 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970), as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (Supp. IV, 1974).
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 5, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 29, at 1423.
14 SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 2, 5, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 29, at 1420, 1423.
45 See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
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use the nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing
of wastes. 4 6
The premise of effluent controls, then, is that pollutants may be
discharged into a body of water only if control technology to
eliminate the pollutant entirely is not yet practicable or available.
Although effluent limitations are technology-based and are
independent of water quality, the Act as amended retained water
quality criteria as supplemental control standards. Pollutant discharges that comply with the effluent limitation based on the
"best available" technology standard for that particular industrial
category may nonetheless offend the water quality criterion that
has been established for the concentration of a given pollutant in
the receiving body of water. In such a case, the EPA under
section 302 of the Act 47 may establish a stricter effluent limitation that takes into account the water quality criterion. Generally,
no effluent discharge will be permitted that would8 violate the
4
water quality criteria for the recipient watercourse.
C. Synopsis of Key Regulatory Provisions
Section 30 1(a) of the Act4 9 sets forth the basic prohibition of
the discharge of pollutants. Thus "the discharge of any
pollutant"50 is unlawful under section 301 (a) unless conducted in
compliance with section 301 itself (effluent limitations), section
302 (water-quality-related effluent limitations), 51 section 306
46 SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 42, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
29, at 1460.
47 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. IV, 1974). The EPA may employ water quality criteria
as an additional tool for achieving the Act's goal of "swimmable water" by 1983. See
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (Supp. IV,
1974).
48
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C)
(Supp. IV, 1974) (effluent limitations stricter than the 1977 standard may be imposed
to meet state or federal water quality criteria for existing point sources); id. § 303, 33
U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. IV, 1974) (existing state water quality standards remain in effect;
the EPA approves all new water quality standards and identifies locations where effluent limitations are not sufficiently strict to meet water quality criteria).
49 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). Section 301(a) provides: "Except as in
compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act,
the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."
50The discharge of a pollutant is defined under the Act as "(A) any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant
to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a
vessel or other floating craft." Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 502(12), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12) (Supp. IV, 1974).
91 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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(standards of performance for new sources),5 2 section 307 (toxic
effluent standards),5 3 section 318 (aquaculture program
requirements), 54 section 402 (national permit system),5 5 and section 404 (standards for dredging material).5 6
Section 301(b) of the Act contemplates the achievement of
effluent limitations:
In order to carry out the objective of this Act there
shall be achieved-(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977,
effluent limitations for point sources . . . which shall
require the application of the best practicable control
technology currently available as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section 304(b) of this Act... ;
(2)(A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limitations
for categories and classes of point sources ... which (i)
shall require application of the best available technology
economically achievable . . . as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to Section 304(b)(2) of this Act. .... 57
As this provision is couched in the passive voice, it remains frustratingly unclear just how effluent limitations5 8 are to be
achieved.
The two competing views.of EPA's asserted power to establish directly national effluent limitations for existing point
sources turn on the interplay between section 304(b) and section
402. Section 304(b) of the Act authorizes the EPA to promulgate
guidelines for effluent limitations and describes what those guidelines must include:
For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent
limitations under this Act the Administrator shall . . .
52

1d. § 1316.
53Id. § 1317.
54Id. § 1328.
551d.
§ 1342.
56
1d. § 1344.
57Id. § 1311(b).
" The Act defines "effluent limitations" as "any restriction established by a State or
the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged ....
Federal Water Pollution Control
Act § 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (Supp. IV, 1974). The EPA's own definition of the
term is identical in all relevant respects with the above definition, but it excludes stateestablished limitations. 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(i) (1975). The Fourth Circuit recently set
aside this regulation, noting that the statutory definition must prevail. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261, at 18 (4th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 3165 (1976).
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publish . . . regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations .... Such regulations shall-

(1)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological
characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best practicable control technology currently available for classes and categories of point sources (other than publicly
owned treatment works); and
(B) specify factors to be taken into account in
determining the control measures and practices to be applicable to point sources (other
than publicly owned treatment works) within
such categories or classes.... ;
(2)(A) identify . . . the degree of effluent re-

duction attainable through the application of
the best control measures and practices achievable . . . for classes and categories of point

sources (other than publicly owned treatment
works); and
(B) specify factors to be taken into account
in determining the best measures and practices available to comply with subsection (b)(2)
of section 301 of this Act to be applicable to
any point source (other than publicly owned
treatment works) within such categories or
classes ....59

Section 304(b)(1)(A) instructs the EPA to determine the degree
of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the
1977 technology required by section 301(b)(1)(A)(i); similarly,
section 304(b)(2)(A) refers to the 1983 technology required by
section 301(b)(2)(A)(i).
These subsections also specify what factors the EPA must
consider in defining the best technology under the 1977 and
1983 standards. 60 For example, under section 304(b)(1)(B), de59 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
60 It is unclear from the statute whether the EPA need only consider these factors
in establishing guidelines, or whether the guidelines themselves must indicate to the
permit-issuing authority the relative weight that these factors should be given when
effluent limitations for a particular point source are established through the permit
process. The latter view is of course inconsistent with the EPA's asserted § 301(b) power
to establish directly national effluent limitations. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Train,
407 F. Supp. 96, 104-05 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
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termination of the 1977 "best practicable" technology shall include:
consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be
achieved from such application, and shall also take into
account the age of equipment and facilities involved,
the process employed, the engineering aspects of the
application of various types of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact
(including energy requirements), and such other factors
as the Administrator deems appropriate . . . .61
Similar factors must be considered under section 304(b)(2)(B) in
assessing the 1983 technology, except that the cost of effluent
reduction need not be weighed specifically against the effluent
reduction benefits.
Section 402 of the Act establishes the national permit system, which is designed to ensure that any pollutant discharge by
point sources is in compliance with, inter alia, section 301(b)'s
62
mandate that specified effluent limitations "shall be achieved.
Section 402 does not explicitly require existing dischargers to
obtain a permit; but, as one commentator has said, section
301(a)'s mandate of compliance with section 402's provisions
"would be meaningless if a discharger could choose not to apply
for a permit. ' 63 Under section 402(b) the EPA has delegated
64
permit-issuing power to twenty-seven states.
It is unclear whether the applicable effluent limitation described in section 301 exists independently of the permit procedure or whether the permit procedure defines the section 301
effluent limitation on an individual point source basis by applying the section 304 guidelines. Industrial dischargers have urged
that the EPA lacks authority to establish effluent limitations. On
this view, the Act calls for the EPA to issue only section 304(b)
guidelines, which the permit-issuing authority must consult; the
61 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
6 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402(a)(I), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (Supp.

IV, 1974).
63 Zener, supra note 16, at 727 n.194.
64 See note 9 supra. The EPA has granted permit-issuing authority to the following
states (in order of approval): California, Oregon, Connecticut, Michigan, Washington,
Wisconsin, Ohio, Vermont, Delaware, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Georgia, Kansas,
Minnesota, Maryland, Missouri, Hawaii, Indiana, Wyoming, Colorado, Virginia, South
Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, North Carolina, New York. BNA ENVIRON. REP.
STATE WATER LAWS
611:0111 (1976).
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effluent limitations called for by section 301(b) are established
when the authority determines the permitted discharge level for
each point source. The EPA has maintained that it is authorized
to establish directly effluent limitations for industrial categories
and subcategories. One court that upheld the EPA's position
observed that
it would seem inconsistent to require, on the one hand,
both the achievement of effluent limitations applying certain levels of technology [section 301(b)] and
the promulgation of regulations by the Administrator
which "identify . . . the degree of effluent reduction
attainable" through those levels of technology [section
304(b)], while at the same time allowing permit grantors
to determine for themselves, bound only by section
304(b) guidelines, what levels of effluent limitation are
65
to be achieved.
Six of the seven courts of appeals that have passed on the ques66
tion have sustained the EPA's position.
III.

JURISDICTION

To REVIEW

THE

EPA's

NATIONAL

EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES

Section 509(b)(1) of the Act as amended provides in relevant
part that "[r]eview of the Administrator's action .. .(E) in ap-

proving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301, 302, or 306 . . . may be had by any

interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States .... -67 It follows that if the EPA's controversial regulations for existing sources were issued "under section 301," then
direct review lies in the courts of appeals. If the regulations
cannot be reviewed directly in the courts of appeals, then direct
review is available only in the district courts under the Adminis68
trative Procedure Act.

6'American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1039 (3d Cir. 1975).
" The Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits
have upheld the EPA's position. American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1465, at
15-16 (10th Cir., Aug. 11, 1976); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464
(D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976); Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1687 (2d
Cir., Apr. 28, 1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 (4th Cir.,
Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526
F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
1975). The Eighth Circuit has held that the EPA lacks authority to establish national effluent limitations. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
67 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
68 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970); see CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1038 &
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Six of the seven circuit courts that have heard challenges to
the EPA regulations have concluded that section 509(b)(1)(E)
places jurisdiction to review the regulations in the courts of
appeals. 69 The Second, 70 Seventh, 71 and District of Columbia
Circuits7 2 reasoned that because the effluent limitations guidelines were issued pursuant to section 301(b), the courts of ap73
peals had jurisdiction to review the regulations. The Fourth
and Tenth7 4 Circuits viewed this approach as question-begging,
because the question whether section 301(b) authorizes the EPA
to establish limitations was in each case the central issue on the
merits. 75 Both courts thus passed by the question of the EPA's
section 301(b) power, and went on to hold that jurisdiction rest-

n.12 (8th Cir. 1975); Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96, 98 (S.D. Iowa
1976); cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No. 75-4119, at 4456-58 (2d Cir., June 28,
1976). But see American Paper Inst. v. Train, 381 F. Supp. 553, 554 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd
on other grounds, No. 74-1480 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 6, 1976).
69 The Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits
have held that direct review of the EPA's regulations lies in the courts of appeals.
American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976); Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1687 (2d Cir., Apr. 28, 1976); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662
(1976); American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975); American
Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA,
526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction by implication). The Eighth Circuit has held
that the courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to review directly the EPA's regulations. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). A district court in the
Ninth Circuit has reached the same result as the majority of the circuit courts. Shell Oil
v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
1o Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1687, at 6711 (2d Cir., Apr.
28, 1976) (semble).
71 American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1975).
72 American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 32, 35-37 (D.C. Cir., May
11, 1976).
13 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136, 1142 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976).
14 American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 (10th Cir. 1975),followed in American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1465, at 3 (10th Cir., Aug. 11, 1976).
75 The Seventh Circuit explicitly rested its conclusions that the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines were authorized by § 301(b) and that the court therefore had jurisdiction under § 509(b)(1) on the EPA's own interpretation of the Act. The court stated
that under Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), its inquiry
was "not whether the agency's interpretation of § 301 is the only permissible one, but
rather whether it is sufficiently reasonable to preclude us from substituting our judgment for that of the agency." American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 450 (7th Cir.
1975) (footnote omitted). NaturalResources Defense Council has been generally held applicable to questions of EPA power under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See
notes 102-05 infra & accompanying text. Its use by the Seventh Circuit in American Meat
Inst., however, entailed deferring to the EPA on the question whether the court had
jurisdiction over the case. The Fourth Circuit noted this anomaly but expressed no
opinion on its propriety. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136, 1140
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976).
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ed in the courts of appeals because the challenged regulations
sought to execute the common purpose of section 304(b), which
authorizes the issuance of guidelines, 76 and section 30 1(b), which
serves as a jurisdictional nexus. The Third Circuit77 assumed
jurisdiction without discussion. Only the Eighth Circuit 78 held
that original jurisdiction was not conferred on the courts of appeals by section 509(b)(1)(E), and it did so by first deciding that
the EPA's
regulations were not authorized under section
79
301(b).
The sparse legislative history of section 509 indicates only
that the Conference Committee adopted the Senate provision
80
for court of appeals review of most EPA actions under the Act.

Section 509(b)(1) provides for court of appeals review of EPA
actions
(A) in promulgating any standard of performance under section 306, (B) in making any determination pursuant to section 306(b)(1)(C), (C) in promulgating any
effluent standard, prohibition, or treatment standard
under section 307, (D) in making any determination
as to a State p.ermit program submitted under section
402(b), (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent
limitation or other limitation under section 301, 302,
or 306, and (F) in issuing or denying any permit under
section 402 . ... 8
76 Section 304(b) provides that "the Administrator shall ..
publish.. . regulations,
providing guidelines for effluent limitations .... ." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. IV,
1974); see text accompanying notes 58-61 supra. The controversy over the EPA's §
301(b) power is in part a controversy over the role that the guidelines are to play in the
permit process. Industrial dischargers have argued that "[slince the Administrator does
not need guidelines to guide himself, the intention of Congress . . . was to guide the
permit-issuing official or agency who, in issuing permits for specific plants, would
thereby create the effluent limitations for that plant." Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp.
v. Train, No. 74-1687, at 6703 (2d Cir., Apr. 28, 1976). The EPA's position is that its
effluent limitations guidelines are both the guidelines required by § 304(b) and the
effluent limitations authorized by § 301(b). E.g., id. at 6703-04; American Frozen Food
Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 38-40 & n.6 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976). Briefly, the EPA
argues that although its regulations are cast in the form of fixed-value limitations for
particular industrial subcategories, the guidelines requirement was aimed only at informing the EPA, itself, and so was properly collapsed into the limitation-setting procedure. Id. at 38-39.
17 American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
78 CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975),followed in Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
79 CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1037-43 (8th Cir. 1975).
8o CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 147-48, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 29, at 330-3 1.
81 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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The Second Circuit pointed out recently, however, that "the
complexity and specificity" of section 509(b) suggest that not all
EPA actions are reviewable in the courts of appeals. 82 Among
the actions not listed in section 509(b)(1) are EPA approval of
state water quality standards under section 303 and EPA designation of hazardous substances under section 311(b)(2). Moreover, the Act specifically provides for district court jurisdiction
over enforcement actions brought by the EPA 83 as well as citizen
84
suits brought against polluters or against the Administrator.
The general jurisdictional scheme of the Act thus emerges.
Direct court of appeals review is intended only when an EPA
action actually establishes some kind of effluent limitation,
whether such limitation is national in scope (as when the EPA
promulgates "standards of performance" under section 306 for
all new sources in a particular subcategory) or applies to a single
point source (as when the EPA issues a permit under section
402). District court review is intended when an EPA action does
not by itself establish an effluent limitation (as when the EPA
adopts a state's section 303 water quality implementation plan,8 5
or when the EPA seeks court enforcement of a previouslyestablished effluent limitation8 6 ).
This allocation of jurisdiction appears to reflect the congressional intent "to establish expeditious and consistent application
of limitations."8 7 The Act thus has been interpreted as centralizing review of effluent limitations in the courts of appeals. The
Fourth Circuit, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,88 rested
its holding that jurisdiction to review section 301(b) effluent limitations lies in the courts of appeals on the provision in section
509(b)(1)(E) for review of effluent limitations ("standards of performance" for new sources) established under section 306:
Were we to accept appellants' interpretation of the Act,
review of regulations governing existing sources would
82 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No. 75-4119, at 4456 (2d Cir., June 28, 1976).

83 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (Supp. IV,
1974).
84

1d. § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
8533 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. IV, 1974); see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No.
75-4119 (2d Cir., June 28, 1976).
8 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (Supp. IV,
1974).
87 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244, 1253 (W.D.Va.
1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976) (footnote
omitted); accord, American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 23 (D.C. Cir.,
May 11, 1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 1975).
88 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 1662 (1976).
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lie in the district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act, while review of new source standards would
be before the courts of appeals under § 509. We do not
conclude that Congress
intended for review to be bifur8 9
cated in this manner.
The court went on to add in a footnote:
The practical difficulties occasioned by such a review procedure are illustrated by means of an example.
Assume that an existing plant licensed under the Act
expands. It is possible that the expanded portion of the
plant would constitute a new point source within the
meaning of § 306. In that event, the plant could be
compelled to maintain two actions simultaneously, one
in the district court and another in the court of appeals,
in order to challenge the action of the Administrator.
The jurisdictional overlap would only add to the complexities already inherent in the statute. 90
A similar overlap could result from the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines are section
304(b) guidelines and are directly reviewable only in the district
court. If the EPA were to respond by promulgating two distinct
sets of regulations-section 304(b) guidelines followed by section
301(b) effluent limitations 9 1-then only the latter could be reviewed in the courts of appeals. According to the district court in
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
this would create duplicative litigation because of the
close interrelationship between these sections and the
fact that the administrative record in each suit would be
59
d. at 1141 (footnote omitted). The Second Circuit recently distinguished El. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. in a case involving judicial review of EPA approval of New
York's water quality standards. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No. 75-4119 (2d Cir.,
June 28, 1976). The court reasoned that effluent limitations often have national scope
and immediate impact on dischargers, whereas water quality standards apply only in a
single state and have a less direct effect on individual dischargers. Although the different impact on dischargers is an appropriate distinction, the national/local scope of EPA
action is not, as § 509(b)(1)(F) provides specifically for court of appeals review of permit
issuance or denial, which affects only a single source.
9' 528 F.2d at 1141 n.5.
91Petitioners in one recent case apparently conceded the EPA's § 301(b) authority
to establish effluent limitations and argued that the Act requires the EPA to issue §
304(b) guidelines first and then, as a second phase of the process, to issue § 301 effluent limitations, which are shaped by the guidelines. American Frozen Food Inst. v.
Train, No. 74-1464, at 38 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:120

virtually identical. In addition, any successful challenge
to guidelines in the district court would affect the limitations which could only be challenged in the Courts of
Appeals and would thus hinder the goal of prompt ju92
dicial review.
In short, court of appeals review of the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines is required by the jurisdictional scheme of the
Act. To reach this result the section 301 issue need not be determined; it is sufficient that the Act contemplates court of appeals review whenever an EPA action establishes some kind of
effluent limitation and that the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines, if enforced, would effectively establish such limitations.
The allegation that the EPA has exceeded its authority in promulgating an effluent limitation should not strip the courts of
appeals of jurisdiction to review the disputed limitation in the
first instance.
IV.

THE

EPA's

POWER

To ISSUE

NATIONAL EFFLUENT

LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES UNDER SECTION

301(b)

A. General Problems in Interpreting Section 301(b)
Any assessment of the EPA's section 301(b) power must
begin with a recognition of the lack of explicit congressional
authorization for the issuance of effluent limitations under that
section. The "astonishingly imprecise" 93 mandate of section
301(b) that effluent limitations "shall be achieved" contrasts
sharply with the statute's clear authorization of EPA effluent
limitations in other contexts. Section 306(b)(1)(B), for example,
provides that "the Administrator shall propose and publish regulations establishing federal standards of performance for new
sources . . . ."94 Equally clear is the section 307(b)(1) directive
that "the Administrator shall promulgate ... pretreatment stan92 383 F. Supp. at 1254. The Eighth Circuit's holding has in fact led to duplicative
litigation simply because the jurisdictional issue remains open pending the Supreme
Court's decision in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. For example, when the Sierra Club
sought to challenge the exemption of iron and steel plants along Ohio's Mahoning
River from the EPA's industry-wide effluent limitations, it filed an action in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. The Sierra Club also filed an action in the Third
Circuit "to protect the club's rights since it is not clear under the [Federal Water Pollution Control Act]" whether jurisdiction to review lies in the district court or in the court
of appeals. 7 BNA ENVIRON. REP. CURRENT DEV. 288 (June 18, 1976).
93E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261, at 13 (4th Cir., Mar. 10,
1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976).
94 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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dards" for the introduction of pollutants into any publicly-owned
treatment system. 95 Section 307(a)(2) provides that the Administrator "shall publish a proposed effluent standard" for toxic pollutants, that he shall hold a hearing on the proposed standard,
and that, unless evidence adduced at the hearing leads him to
modify the proposed standard, "such standard . . . shall be
promulgated. 9 6 The passive voice used in the final clause does
not raise a substantial question about the manner in which the
final toxic effluent standards are to be established. With respect
to section 301(b), however, the ambiguity arising from the passive voice is not satisfactorily resolved by other statutory
97
language.
One approach to the unavoidable problem of statutory interpretation is exemplified by the Second Circuit's decision in
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train.9 8 The court declared
that "the statutory language is devoid of plain meaning," 99 and
went on to resolve the issue of the nature of the EPA's power
under section 301(b) by examining the legislative history of the
1972 Amendments.1 0 0 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit pointed
out that "statements can be found [in the 1,766-page legislative
history] to uphold almost any position which one cares to
take," 10 1 and resolved the section 301 issue without referring to
the legislative history.
The EPA's own interpretation of its power under section
301 may be given much weight by a reviewing court faced with
the task of construing this ambiguous section. In fact, a recent
Supreme Court decision, Train v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 10 2 suggests strongly that judicial review of the EPA's effluent
limitations guidelines should be narrowly confined. Natural Resources Defense Council involved the EPA's interpretation of sections 110(a)(3) and 110(f) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
95

Id. § 1317(b)(1).
§ 1317(a)(2).
But cf. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 32, 35-36 (D.C.
Cir., May 11, 1976) (upholding EPA power to set effluent limitations because "§ 301 is
the basic enforcement mechanism relied upon by Congress").
98 No. 74-1687 (2d Cir., Apr. 28, 1976).
9
1d. at 6709.
100 The court quoted with approval the Fourth Circuit's assessment of the legislative
history, set out in text accompanying note 101 infra. No. 74-1687, at 6708. It nevertheless relied heavily on statements contained in the legislative history to support its conclusion.
101E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261, at 14 (4th Cir., Mar. 10,
1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976).
102421 U.S. 60 (1975).
96
1d.
97
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1970.103 The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, reviewed the statutory framework of the 1970 Amendments in detail, and concluded:
[T]he Agency's interpretation of §§ 10(a)(3) and 110(f)
was "correct," to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a
complex statute such as this is the "correct" one. Given
this conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is
charged with administration of the Act, and that there
has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation
by the States and other parties affected by the Act, we
have no doubt whatsoever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals
from substituting its judgment for that of the
4

Agency.

10

Five circuit courts of appeals have applied the Natural Resources
Defense Council standard in the course of reviewing EPA interpretations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as
amended. 10 5 This approach seems correct, based on the three
factors enumerated by the Supreme Court; the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act is quite complex, the EPA is charged with
its administration, and scores of thousands of industrial dischargers have been issued permits that implement the EPA's
reading of section 301(b). Additionally, the "sufficiently reasonable" standard would aid the EPA in meeting future statutory
deadlines, because the delay that might result from conflicting
judicial interpertations of the Act would not occur.
Closer scrutiny of the first factor in Natural Resources Defense
Council, however, is in order. If the section 301(b) issue is to be
resolved under the Supreme Court's test, the EPA's interpreta103 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 c-5(a)(3), (f) (1970), amending Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485.
104 421 U.S. at 87 (citations omitted). There is room for doubt concerning the
precedential value of this analysis, for the Court's pronouncements on when a reviewing court may substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency have been
somewhat irregular. See 4 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.06-.08 (1958,
Supp. 1970); K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE 70's § 30.00 (1976). A detailed
evaluation of Natural Resources Defense Council lies beyond the scope of this Comment.
105 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No.°75-4119, at 4458 (2d Cir., June 28, 1976);
American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 40-41 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976);
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 (4th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 449-50 &
n.16 (7th Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1041-42 (3d
Cir. 1975).
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tion must be correct "to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation" of the Act is
"correct." This Comment will examine the arguments for and
against the EPA's interpretation of its power under section
301(b), and will conclude that the EPA's construction of the Act
satisfies this test.
B. An Assessment of CPC International Inc. v. Train
CPC InternationalInc. v. Train10 6 was the first case in which
the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines were challenged. On a
number of grounds, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the EPA
lacked authority under section 301(b) to issue the regulations,
and that because the regulations were not authorized under sec10 7
tion 301, they could be reviewed only in the district court.
1. Authorization of "National Standards" in
Other Areas Distinguished From the
Section 301(b) Mandate
Initially, the court emphasized that section 301 contained no
express authorization for the EPA to issue regulations, whereas
other sections of the statute clearly authorized the EPA to issue,
inter alia, "standards of performance" for new sources and "effluent standards" for toxic pollutant discharges. 10 8 The court
identified four features that purportedly characterized Congress'
authorization of such "standards":
In providing for national standards in these areas, Congress did four things: (1) it used the term "standards," a
word which takes on a special meaning because of its
use under the Act; (2) it expressly provided that the
standards were to be published by regulation; (3) it put
deadlines on the process, requiring that the Administrator publish the standards within a fixed period of
time; and (4) it provided that standards were to be enforceable independently of the permit system.' 0 9
Although the court failed to state the "special meaning" that
it believed the term "standards" acquired under the Act, the

106

515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).

107These conclusions have not been reached outside the Eighth Circuit. See cases

cited 0notes 66, 69supra.
1 8 See text accompanying notes 50-57 supra.
109 515 F.2d at 1038.
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point is a doubtful one. Title III of the Act, 10 beginning with
section 301's mandate of effluent limitations, bears the heading
"Standards and Enforcement." Section 502 defines nineteen key
terms used in the statute, including "effluent limitations,""' but
fails to mention "standards"; the definition of "effluent limitation" makes it plain that any "standard" would also be an effluent limitation." 2 Furthermore, section 316(b) mandates the
inclusion of certain additional requirements in "[a]ny standard
' 13
established pursuant to section 301 or section 306 of this Act."
Thus, even if the Eighth Circuit is correct about the distinction
between "standards" and "limitations," section 316(b) indicates
that section 301 authorizes the issuance of national standards.
The only possible sources of such authorization, apart from
section 301(b), are sections 301(c) and 301(f). Section 301(c)
' 1 4 of
permits the Administrator to "modify the requirements"
section 301(b)(2)(A), which defines the required 1983 effluent
limitations, regarding any point source that meets certain conditions. If, however, individual variances such as these are "standards" and nationwide new source regulations, which section
306 plainly authorizes, are also "standards," it is difficult to see
what "special meaning" that term has or why Congress would
include it in every grant of rulemaking authority. It is equally
difficult to see a rationale behind section 316(b) if it applies only
to new sources, which are subject to the stringent provisions of
section 306, and to those existing sources that qualify for a variance under section 301(c), but not to the great bulk of existing
sources. Section 301(f), on the other hand, bans the discharge of
certain substances into navigable waters "[n]otwithstanding any
other provisions of this Act." 1 15 This prohibition contains not a
shadow of authority for the issuance of regulations. In short, the
reference in section 316(b) to section 301 probably pertains to
section 301(b) effluent limitations. Therefore, the fact that section 301(b) does not use the term "standards" is little evidence
that Congress did not intend for the EPA to issue national effluent limitations."16
The second feature isolated by the Eighth Circuit as distinguishing section 301(b) from sections concededly authorizing
11033 U.S.C. §§ 1311-28 (Supp. IV, 1974).

11Id.
§ 1362(11).
112
See note 58 supra.
11333 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
"'Id.

§ 1311(c).

115 1d. § 1311(f).
116 American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 450 n.17 (7th Cir. 1975).
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"national standards"--sections 306(b)(1)(B) (national standards
of performance for new sources), 307(a)(2) (toxic pollutant effluent standards), and 307(b)(1) (pretreatment standards)-was
the express provision for the issuance of regulations under those
other sections. Section 307(a)(2) is somewhat ambiguous in that
the manner of establishingfinal standards is not detailed. With
this qualification, the Eighth Circuit's observation is sound. It
simply reiterates, however,
the initial problem that necessitates
17
analysis of the statute.
The third feature cited by the court in CPC Internationalwas
the provision of a statutory deadline in the three instances in
which Congress expressly had conferred rulemaking authority.
Apparently the court overlooked the two deadlines specified in
section 301(b) for the achievement of the two phases of effluent
limitations." 8 It is difficult to imagine that Congress intended
the July 1, 1977 deadline to be met through the issuance of
scores of thousands of permits without the aid of national section
301(b) regulations." 9 Thus, one commentator has concluded
that
if the 1977 deadline in § 301 of the Act is to be met,
the problems involved lead to the conclusion that EPA
should issue effluent standards by regulation for as
many industries as possible, as soon as possible, and that
once some effluent standards are promulgated by regulation, priority in permit issuance should be given to
20
dischargers covered by such standards.
The final factor specified by the court as identifying the
authorization of "standards" was that where Congress envisioned
such regulations, it provided that they were to be enforceable
apart from the permit process. First, it should be noted that this
independent enforceability is unnecessary. Any restrictions applicable to a point source by reason of sections 306, 307(a), or
307(b) will become conditions of the discharger's permit under
sections 402(a)(1) and 402(a)(2) (concerning EPA-issued permits)
1 17

Id.

118Limitations requiring the application of the best practicable control technology

currently available must be achieved by July 1, 1977; limitations requiring the application of the best available technology economically achievable must be achieved by July
1, 1983. Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 301(b)(1)(A), (2)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
119
See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 707-08, 710
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum).
120 Zener, supra note 16, at 731.
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or section 402(b)(1)(A) (concerning permits issued under an
EPA-approved state permit program), and as such will be enforceable in an action brought by the EPA 121 or in a citizen
suit. 1 22 Second, it is not clear that section 301(b) effluent limitations are not enforceable apart from the permit process. Section
505(a)(1)(A) of the Act authorizes citizen suits against any person
alleged to be in violation of "an effluent standard or limitation
under this Act.' 12 3 This phrase is defined in section 505(f) to
include, inter alia, "(2) an effluent limitation or other limitation
under section 301 or 302 of this Act; . . . or (6) a permit or
condition thereof issued under section 502 of this Act ... 124
Four circuits have interpreted section 505(f)(2) as authorizing
citizen suits based on alleged violations of section 301(b) effluent
limitations, 1 25 reasoning that section 505(f)(2) would be superfluous if effluent limitations did not exist apart from the permit
process.
The court in CPCInternationaladopted a different interpretation: "The independent reference to § 301 is necessary because
§ 301(f) bans the discharge of [certain ultrahazardous substances]."'1 2 6 This view can be supported only if one disregards
the definition of "effluent limitation" set out in section 502(11),
which confines that term to a "restriction established by a state or
1 27
Section 301(f) is a stautory prohibition esthe Administrator."'
tablished by Congress. The section 502(11) definition is not modified by the section 505(f) definition; the latter by its terms defines only the phrase "effluent standard or limitation under this
Act" as that phrase is used in section 505, whereas the former
defines the phrase "effluent limitation" as used in the Act "except
as otherwise specifically provided."' 2 8 Because the term in controversy is "effluent limitation or other limitation under section
301 or 302 of this Act," which is an element of the section 505(f)
definition itself, the section 502(11) definition must govern.
121 Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 309(a)(2)(A), (b), 33 U.S.C. §§
1319(a)(2)(A), (b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
122 Id. §§ 505(a)(I), (f)(6), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a)(1), (f)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
123 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
124 1d. § 1365(f).
125 American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 31 (D.C. Cir., May 11,
1976) (by implication); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 451 (7th Cir. 1975);
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1975); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d
1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 1662 (1976).
126 515 F.2d at 1043.
127 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis supplied).
128 Id. § 1362 (emphasis supplied).
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The remaining argument supporting the Eighth Circuit's
position is that the term just quoted should be taken to mean
"effluent limitation under section 302 or other limitation under
section 301 of this Act." There are two serious objections to this
approach. First, it assumes that the legislative draftsmen carelessly phrased section 505(f)(2) so that it includes, along with
the two items that the draftsmen intended to include, one that
they did not want to include (effluent limitations under section
301). Second, the section-by-section analysis of the 1972 Amendments in the Senate Report states that under section 505, "citizens
are granted authority to bring enforcement actions for violations of schedules or timetables of compliance and effluent limitations under section 301 ....
29 Nothing in the legislative history
indicates that the authorization of citizen suits for violations of
section 301 effluent limitations, apart from violations of any permit, was controverted at any time.
Similar issues have been raised in regard to section 309(a)(3),
which authorizes the Administrator to bring an enforcement action if he "finds that any person is in violation of section 301,
302, 306, 307, or 308 of this Act, or is in violation of any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections
...
,"130 The EPA contends that the reference to section 301 was
intended to authorize enforcement, in cases where no permit
had been issued, of section 301(b) effluent limitations issued by
the Administrator. a3 1 The Eighth Circuit in CPC International
replied that "§ 30 1(a) prohibits discharging without a permit, and
it is to that conduct which § 309 is addressed."'13
Some scattered support exists for the EPA's interpretation
of the statute, 1 33 but the House Report speaks only of "[f]ederal
enforcement of violations of an unpermitted discharge under
section 301 or a violation of any permit condition or limitation
129

SENATE

REPORT, supra

note 29, at 82, reprinted in

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra

note 29, at 1500 (emphasis supplied). The Senate bill contained somewhat narrower
language than did the compromise bill: "(2) an effluent limitation under section 301 or
302 of this Act." S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 505(f)(2) (1971). The House bill as
passed in March 1972 contained the language that appeared in the compromise bill.
H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 505(f)(2) (1972). No explantation appears for the
choice of the House formulation.
13033 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
131E.g., CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1043 (8th Cir. 1975).
1321Id.

133See S. 2770, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 309(a)(3) (1971); Letter from the Administrator of the EPA, William D. Ruckelshaus, to Representative Blatnik, Dec. 13, 1971, in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 834, 847; 118 CONG. REc. 10208 (1972) (statement of Representative Jones submitted during House debate on H.R. 11896, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 360, 361.
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which implements [the requirements of §§ 302, 306, 307, or
308]." 13 4 The Conference Committee adopted the House version of section 309(a)(3) in lieu of the Senate version.1 3 5 As the
latter could be read to support the EPA's position, the Conference Committee's determination appears to have eliminated the
possibility that Congress intended section 301(b) effluent limitations to be independently enforceable under section 309. Nevertheless, in light of the enforcement provision for citizen suits
based on section 301(b), the statutory deadlines for the achievement of effluent limitations, and the section 316(b) reference to
"standard[s] established pursuant to section 301," the Eighth
Circuit's principal argument against the EPA's interpretation of
its section 301(b) power is of little force.
2. Reliance on Section 402(d)(2)
In rejecting the EPA's position on its power to issue regulations under section 301(b), the Eighth Circuit in CPC International also relied on section 402(d)(2) of the Act, which authorizes the EPA to veto state-issued permits. Section 402(d)(2)
provides in part: "No permit shall issue... (B) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of the proposed
permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such
136
permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of this Act."
The court seized upon the reference to "guidelines," and stated:
"It is hard to imagine a clearer indication that the permit-issuing
authority is to follow the guidelines promulgated under § 304(b),
and is not to refer to independent regulations promulgated
under § 301."137
The reference to "requirements," however, may reasonably
be read to include effluent limitations established pursuant to
section 301(b). Section 402(b)(1)(A) enumerates provisions of the
Act that are to be implemented through the permit system, and
it refers to "any applicable requirements of sections 301, 302,
306, 307 and 403." In contrast, although section 402(d)(2) indicates that permits must be within the strictures of "guidelines" of
the Act, section 402 never explicitly requires that permits satisfy
section 304 itself. This led the Third Circuit to view section 402
"as requiring compliance both with section 301 limitations and
134 HOUSE REPORT, supra note

32, at 114, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra

note 29, at 801.
13-CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 131-32, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 29, at 314-15.
13633 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis supplied).
137515 F.2d at 1038-39 (footnote omitted).
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with any guidelines promulgated by the Administrator."'13 8 It is
possible that the reference to section 301 in this context was to
the section 301(f) ban on ultrahazardous substances rather than
to section 301(b) effluent limitations. But that would not preclude reading "requirements" in section 402(d)(2) to include
section 301(b) effluent limitations as well as the section 301(f)
limitations. Even if section 402(d)(2) did not refer to section
301(b), however, there is no reason to conclude that section
402(d)(2)(B)'s abbreviated reference to the "guidelines and requirements of this Act" in the context of the veto of state-issued
permits supports a rejection of the EPA's authority to issue effluent limitations under section 301(b).
3. Reliance on Section 515
As an additional ground for rejecting the EPA's interpretation of its power under section 301(b), the Eighth Circuit
pointed to section 515 of the Act, 1 39 which establishes a panel of
scientific and technical experts known as the Effluent Standards
and Water Quality Information Advisory Committee (ESWQIAC). Six months before the Administrator issues section
304(b) guidelines, section 306(b) new source standards, or section 307(a) toxic pollutant standards, he is required by section
515(b)(1) to notify the ESWQIAC of his intent to issue such
regulations. The ESWQIAC may hold public hearings on the
proposal and must in any event transmit to the Administrator all
40
relevant scientific and technical information in its possession.
Such information becomes part of the record that the Administrator must consider before issuing any regulations.' 4 1 If Congress had intended national effluent limitation regulations to be
issued by the EPA, arguably Congress would have made such
regulations subject to the ESWQIAC procedure; yet section
515(b)(1) enumerates only the three types of regulations set out
above.
There are two possible responses to this position. First, the
sparse legislative history of section 515 contains one indication
that Congress may have intended the ESWQIAC procedure to
apply to section 301 (b) effluent limitations. The Conference Report
138American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1040 (3d Cir. 1975); accord,
American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 30, 32, 36 (D.C. Cir., May 11,
1976).
13933 U.S.C. § 1374 (Supp. IV, 1974).
140 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 515(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1374(b)(2) (Supp.
IV, 1974).
141Id. § 515(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1374(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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states that the Senate version of section 515(b)(1) required the
ESWQIAC to "transmit to the Administrator information on any
proposed effluent limitation regulations.' 1 42 The Senate Report,
however, refers only to "[s]ection 304(b) regulations" and to
"guidelines for effluent limitations," which suggests that the
Conference Committee simply used "effluent limitation regulations" as a shorthand term for "§ 304(b) guidelines for effluent
limitations.' 1 43 In addition, the Conference Committee adopted
the House provision rather than the Senate provision, 1 44 and
there is no indication that the House envisioned ESWQIAC par14
ticipation in the formation of effluent limitations by the EPA.
Second, the assumption that Congress intended all national
regulations issued by the EPA to be issued only after ESWQIAC
participation is questionable. Section 307(b)(1) explicitly authorizes the Administrator to issue pretreatment standards for pollutants discharged into publicly-owned treatment facilities, yet
the ESWQIAC is given no role in the procedure. Sections
311(b)(2)(A) and 312(b)(1) authorize the Administrator to issue
hazardous substance designations and standards of performance
for marine sanitation devices, again without participation by the
ESWQIAC.
In the face of these examples, and in light of the procedure
applicable to sections 301(b) and 304(b), it appears that the omission of section 301(b) effluent limitations from section 515(b)(1)
is entirely consistent with the congressional objective of ensuring
that the EPA's actions are well informed. The procedure contemplated by sections 301(b) and 304(b) was apparently a twostep process for both the 1977 and the 1983 limitations. 1 46 The
142

CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 150, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 29, at 333.
143 SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 86-87, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra

note 29, at 1504-05.
144 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 150, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 29, at 33.
...The House Report describes ESWQIAC's function as that of providing information to the EPA before "effluent limitations and standards criteria [are] issued under
this [Act]." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 139, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 29, at 826. In all likelihood, the relevant reference is to § 304(b) "criteria"
(guidelines) for effluent limitations. Cf. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 515(a)(2),
33 U.S.C. § 1374(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).

146 The following discussion establishes that the policy behind the ESWQIAC procedure is carried out when the EPA issues national effluent limitations as the second
phase of the guidelines/limitations process. This position assumes that the EPA secured

ESWQIAC participation during the first phase, which is the issuance of section 304(b)
guidelines. If the EPA had issued its controversial hybrid "effluent limitations guide-
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EPA first was to publish section 304(b) guidelines defining for
particular subcategories the section 301(b) technology and its
effluent reduction capabilities, as well as the factors to be considered by the permit-issuer in determining which technology a
particular point source would be required to adopt. 1 4 7 Then the
EPA arguably was to issue section 30 1(b) effluent limitations that
specified the required technology and the concomittant discharge limitations for each subcategory. As noted earlier, ESWQIAC participation is required prior to the issuance of section
304(b) guidelines. Congress sought to ensure that scientific expertise would be available when the EPA set out to assess and
rank competing control technologies. In contrast, the translation
of section 304(b) guidelines into section 301(b) effluent limitations requires no additional expertise. The task is presumably
one of applying to particular subcategories the technologies and
the attainable effluent reduction values set out in the section
304(b) guidelines; 1 48 no evaluation of the technical feasibility or
abatement capabilities of competing technologies need be undertaken at this point. In short, little would be served by requiring
ESWQIAC participation in the issuance of effluent limitations.
4.

Treatment of Section 509(b)(1)(E)

Finally, the Eighth Circuit refuted the EPA's construction 15of0
section 509(b)(1)(E).1 4 9 This provision, discussed previously,
authorizes judicial review "of the Administrator's action ... (E)
in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other
limitation under section 301, 302, or 306 . . . . ,15 The EPA
contended that this language plainly contemplated that the Administrator might issue section 301(b) effluent limitations. The
Eighth Circuit disagreed, stating that "[t]he reference to § 301
is necessary if the Administrator's action under § 301(c), modifying the application of the 1983 requirements to certain point
sources, is to be subject to judicial review."' 5 2 This position is
lines" without providing for ESWQIAC participation, the regulations would be subject
to challenge on the ground that the EPA had bypassed the required statutory procedure.
147Cf., e.g., American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 38, 41-42 (D.C.
Cir., May 11, 1976).
148Cf. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1687, at 6703, 6711-12 (2d
Cir., Apr. 28, 1976).
149CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1043 (8th Cir. 1975).
15oSee text accompanying notes 67-92 supra.
15133 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E) (Supp. IV, 1974).
152515 F.2d at 1043.
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untenable, as the Third Circuit pointed out,'5 3 because section
301(c) was adopted by the Conference Committee, and did not
appear in the bill when section 509(b) was drafted.
It remains unclear what Congress did intend by the reference to section 301. If the Administrator may not issue effluent limitations pursuant to section 30 1(b), then the requirement
of section 301(d) that the 1983 effluent limitations be revised
periodically would confer no additional authority on the Administrator. 15 4 Sections 301(a), 301(e), and 301(f) authorize the
Administrator neither to promulgate nor to approve any limitations. It thus appear that the section 509(b)(1)(E) reference was
to section 301(b). It is clear that section 301(b) authorizes no
standards that would be classified as "other limitations" rather
than as "effluent limitations." The legislative history of section
509 does not reveal whether section 301(b) effluent limitations
promulgated by the EPA were specifically contemplated by Congress, but such an interpretation is at least consistent with the
statutory framework. In short, section 509(b)(1)(E) adds some,
but not much, weight to the EPA's side of the argument.
The major arguments put forward by the Eighth Circuit,
therefore, are far from persuasive. A fair reading of the Act
discloses no "special meaning" attributable to the term "standards," and this undercuts any distinction between "standards"
and "limitations." Moreover, Congress did set deadlines for the
"achievement," if not for the issuance, of effluent limitations,
and it provided for citizen suits to enforce those limitations
wholly apart from the enforcement of any permit possessed by a
discharger. Finally, the EPA veto power over permits, the ESWQIAC provisions, and the provision governing judicial review of
the EPA's action in approving or promulgating certain limitations are all consistent with the EPA's asserted section 301(b)
authority. This Comment will now consider whether other provisions of the Act support that authority.

"I American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1027, 1037-38 & nn. 15 &16 (3d
Cir. 1975).
154 Section 301(d)
provides that the 1983 effluent limitations mandated by
§ 301(b)(2) shall be revised "pursuant to the procedure established under" that section.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). It follows that if effluent limitations are to be
"achieved" through the permit process, then § 301(d) confers no authority on the Administrator to "approve" or "promulgate" effluent limitations.
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C. Is the EPA's Power Under Section 301(b) Consistent with
the ProceduresEnvisioned by Congress?
Congress expressly defined two different levels of required
technology in section 301(b). By July 1, 1977 "the best prac155
ticable control technology currently available" is to be in use;
by July 1, 1983 "the best available technology economically
achievable" must be in use.' 5 6 Another dissimilarity in the requirements for the 1977 and 1983 phases is more puzzling. Section 301(b)(1)(A) calls for "effluent limitations for point sources"
to be achieved by 1977, while section 301(b)(2)(A) requires "effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources" to
be achieved by 1983. Does this difference in the statutory language reflect a congressional intent that different procedures be
used in achieving 1977 and 1983 effluent limitations?
The difference in phrasing might be interpreted to mean
that while the 1977 "effluent limitations for point sources" are to
be established on a case-by-case basis by the permit-issuing au57
thority (who must consult the EPA's section 304(b) guidelines),
the 1983 "effluent limitations for categories and classes of point
sources" are to be issued by the EPA in the form of national
regulations applicable to industrial subcategories. Further support for the position that Congress restricted the EPA's power to
issue regulations under section 301(b) to the 1983 phase may be
drawn from section 301(c), which provides:
The Administrator may modify the requirements
of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to any
point source for which a permit application is filed after
155
Id.
56

§ 1311(b)(1)(A)(i).
1 1d. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i).
157 This precise contention apparently has not been made in the § 301 litigation.
Petitioners in three cases, however, have attacked the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines by urging that § 301(b)(1)(A) authorizes the EPA to issue effluent limitations only
for individual point sources. In one such case the Fourth Circuit agreed that this was
the literal meaning of the provision, but concluded that to invalidate the EPA's regulations on this basis would be "chimerical" and would jeopardize the statutory objective.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261, at 21-22 (4th Cir., Mar. 10,
1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976). In another case, the District of Columbia
Circuit relied primarily on legislative history and found the EPA's interpretation of the
Act to be "sufficiently reasonable" under the standard announced in Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Train, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train,
No. 74-1464, at 41-42 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976). Finally, the Third Circuit concluded
that § 301(b) envisioned categorical limitations set by the EPA for both 1977 and 1983,
and that any ambiguity caused by the different statutory language "was inadvertent and
was a result of imprecise legislative drafting." American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526
F.2d 1027, 1042 n.32 (3d Cir. 1975).
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July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator
of such point source satisfactory to the Administrator
that such modified requirements (1) will represent the
maximum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) will result in
reasonable further progress toward the elimination of
1 58
the discharge of pollutants.
No comparable provision for a variance from the 1977 requirements may be found in the Act. The explanation appears to lie
in the fact that Congress contemplated a permit system for the
1977 period. The operator of any point source presumably
could bring to the attention of the permit-issuing authority any
information that would tend to justify a less stringent limitation.
The permit-issuing authority, on this interpretation, would be
bound to consult the EPA's section 304(b) guidelines, but would
be empowered to issue a permit that incorporated an informal
variance.' 5 9 Under the EPA's section 301(b) national effluent
limitations for 1983, however, a permit grantor would be unable
to relax the 1983 standards, however well justified such a relaxation might be, in the absence of section 301(c).' 60 The variance
provision thus complements the additional power conferred upon the EPA under the second phase of section 301(b).
An equally sound explanation for the existence of a variance
provision for 1983 but not for 1977 lies in the extremely restrictive standards that section 301(b)(2)(A) imposes for 1983.161 On
its face, the provision mandates the elimination of pollutant discharges by all point sources in a subcategory if the Administrator
158 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
'5 Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 74-1258, at 6754-55 (2d
Cir., Apr. 28, 1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261, at 17 (4th
Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1039 (3d Cir. 1975).
It is significant that the EPA, in asserting § 301(b) authority to issue 1977 effluent
limitations, found it necessary to issue regulations authorizing variances from those
limitations.
160 The EPA has concluded that variances under its effluent limitations guidelines
for 1977 may be appropriate in some cases, and has included a uniform variance provision in all such guidelines. E.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 422.32, 427.12, 430.32 (1975). Three
circuits have upheld such provisions, one circuit suggesting that "[w]ithout variance
flexibility, the program might well founder on the rocks of illegality." Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 74-1258, at 6755 (2d Cir., Apr. 28, 1976); accord,
American Paper Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1480, at 15-16 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 6, 1976); E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261, at 19-20 (4th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976). But see Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, No. 74-2096 (4th
Cir., July 16, 1976), modified, No. 74-2096 (4th Cir., Aug. 31, 1976).
161 Cf. American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 449 n.15 (7th Cir. 1975).
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determines that the requisite technology is economically achievable for the subcategory as a whole. This requirement would be
inflexible on either view of the section 301(b) issue. If Congress
intended both 1977 and 1983 effluent limitations to be achieved
through the permit process, section 301(b)(2)(A) would appear
to require the Administrator to veto any permit that authorized
any discharge after July 1, 1983 from a source belonging to a
subcategory for which he had found discharge-eliminating technology economically achievable. On the other hand, if Congress
intended the EPA to issue the 1983 limitations, the Administrator would be equally constrained by the language of section
301(b)(2)(A). Support exists in the legislative history for the view
that in enacting the section 301(c) variance provision Congress
sought simply to ensure that a case-by-case implementation of
the rigors of section 301(b)(2)(A) would take place. For example,
the House managers' statement on the Conference Report acknowledges that the 1977 standards will close down some facilities, yet emphasizes that section 301(c) "authorizes a case-by-case
evaluation of any [proposed] modification" of the stricter 1983
standards. 1 62 Moreover, nothing in the legislative history suggests that variances were authorized for 1983 and not for 1977
because the 1977 standards alone would be achieved through
the permit process. In fact, the House bill would have authorized
extensions of up to two years for compliance with the 1977 standards.1 6 3 The provision was deleted without explanation, but it
is fair to assume that the reason was not a shift (from national
regulations to the permit process) in the manner in which section
301 would be implemented as no reference whatever to such a
shift may be found in the legislative history.
Does the dissimilar language ("point sources" versus "categories and classes of point sources") alone support the position
that the EPA was to have greater power relative to the 1983 standards? Both the House and the Senate bills referred initially to
both the 1977 and the 1983 requirements as "effluent limitations
for point sources.' 6 4 Evidently the "categories and classes" language was introduced in the Conference Committee when the
1 65
present definition of the 1983 technology was agreed upon.
162 118 CONG. REC. 33749-50 (1972) (statement of House managers on Conference
Report), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 231-32.
163 H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(b)(3) (1972).
164
1d. § 301(b)(2)(A); S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(b)(2)(A) (1971).
165 Both bills initially required the elimination of pollutant discharge or, under

certain circumstances, the application of a specified level of technology. Section
301(b)(2)(A) of the Senate bill referred to the "best available technology," S. 2770, 92d
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The change may be understood readily in view of the clear congressional intent that the Administrator define the 1977 "best
practicable" and the 1983 "best available" technologies on the
basis of the entire industrial category.16 6 A more cautiously drafted
statute would have used the "categories and classes" language
for both the 1977 and the 1983 standards, but the disparity here
reflects no difference in the EPA's power during the two phases
of the section 301(b) program.
Two other provisions in the Act offer some support for the
view that the EPA has the authority under section 30 1(b) to issue
national effluent limitations for both 1977 and 1983. The first
provision, section 401(a)(1), requires in certain cases that an applicant for a federal permit obtain prior certification from the
state in which the discharge will originate that "there is not an
applicable effluent limitation or other limitation under section
301(b) and 302."' 'l If section 301(b) effluent limitations were
intended to be achieved through the permit process rather than
through EPA regulations, then by definition there would never
be a section 301(b) effluent limitation that applied to a permit
applicant. There would be only the EPA's section 304(b) guidelines for the relevant industrial subcategory. It is possible, however, that in using the section 401(a)(1) language, Congress
meant to refer to "effluent limitations under section 302 or other
limitations under section 301(b)." But this reading of the statute
assumes that section 401(a)(1) was drafted carelessly to encompass section 301(b) effluent limitations when such a result was
not intended. Furthermore, section 301(b) refers specifically to
"effluent limitations," and to nothing else that could be considered an "other limitation." The legislative history, however,
does not resolve the question.168
Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(b)(2)(A) (1971), while § 301(b)(2)(A) of the House bill required
the "best available demonstrated technology," H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §
301(b)(2)(A) (1972). The Conference Committee adopted the present version ("best
available technology economically achievable") and in the process added the "classes or
categories" language. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 120-21, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 29, at 303-04.
16 See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note

29, at 50-51, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 29, at 1468-69; 118 CONG. REC. 33694, 33696 (1972) (exhibit of
Senator Muskie), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 166, 169-70; 118
CONG. REc. 33712 (1972) (statement of Senator Tunney), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 29, at 208; 118 CONG. REc. 33749, 33751 (1972) (statement of
House managers on Conference Report, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29,
at 231, 237; 118 CoNG. REc. 33760 (1972) (statement of Representative Wright),
reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 259.
167 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
168 E.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 121-23, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit in E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train discussed the second provision favorable to the EPA's position, section 501(a), which authorizes the Administrator "to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his func1 69
tions under this Act":
The question then is what are his functions. Section
101(d) says that he "shall administer this Act." The control technology mentioned in § 301 (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)(A)
is that defined and determined by the Administrator
under § 304. Section 301(e) refers to "[e]ffluent limitations established pursuant to this section["] but does not
say who does the establishing. The Act is unworkable
unless someone takes the initiative in deciding what
limitations are generally applicable to discharges,
whether by individual plants, categories, subcategories,
classification, or otherwise. Because the control technology is determined by the Administrator, it is reasonable
that he establish the limitations generally applicable to
categories. Such action is within the performance of his
70
functions.'
This highly pragmatic analysis starts from the premise that section 301(b) does not itself authorize the EPA to issue national
effluent limitations.' 7 1 It is entirely consistent to accept this premise and then to rely on arguments in support of section 301(b)
rulemaking authority to demonstrate that the issuance of such
limitations is the Administrator's function under the Act. Yet the
Fourth Circuit relied principally upon the Administrator's duty
"to administer this Act" and the asserted unworkability of the
Act absent EPA direction. This cursory analysis may be adequate
17 2
to uphold the EPA's power if the "sufficiently reasonable" test
were used, but the court should have endeavored to define both
the limits of section 501(a), which is by its terms tied to the
Administrator's functions under the Act, and the nature and
supra note 29, at 808-10; SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 69, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 29, at 1487; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 138, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 29, at 321.

16933 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
170 No. 74-1261, at 15-16 (4th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165
(1976); accord, American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1465, at 15-16 (10th Cir.,
Aug. 11, 1976).
171 No. 74-1261, at 14-15 (4th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165
(1976).
172 See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
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provenance of the "function" to which the challenged regulations related.
In summary, the statutory discrepancy regarding the 1977
and 1983 limitations is not inconsistent with the EPA's asserted
section 301(b) power for 1977, although sections 401(a)(1) and
501(a) offer little direct support for the EPA's authority to issue
limitations under section 301(b) for either 1977 or 19-83. This
Comment will now consider the relationship of the EPA's challenged regulations to the Act's allocation of power between the
state and federal governments.
D.

Effluent Limitations and the
Allocation of Power
The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, enacted against a background of largely ineffective state
regulation, greatly enlarged the federal water pollution control
effort.' 73 A central issue in the assessment of the EPA's asserted
section 301(b) authority is whether that authority would be consistent with the balance of state and national power envisioned
by Congress.
1. The General Allocation of Power
Under the Act
Under the Act as amended, the principle of state control
over water quality and over local point sources remains an important value. Most states have existing inspection forces that
can easily monitor pollutant discharges, whereas an exclusively
federal program that covered all existing sources "would require
an immense federal bureaucracy."' 174 Section 101(b) of the Act
acknowledges the historical role of the states in water pollution
control:
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and
water resources, and to consult with the Administrator
75
in the exercise of his authority under this Act.'
3

See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
Zener, supra note 16, at 738.
175 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). One commentator has pointed out that
although comparable language has appeared in the Federal Water Pollution Control
"
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Congress also recognized, however, that states hoping to attract or retain industry frequently offered lax standards and
toothless enforcement as a lure. 176 In many cases, states lacked
the expertise needed to set technology-based effluent restrictions
for various industries. Moreover, the effects of water pollution
are often regional or even national. Thus the states' "rights"
referred to in section 101(b) are principally the right to administer an EPA-approved permit program 1 77 and the right to establish and enforce under state law pollution control requirements
at least as stringent as those set under the Act.' 78 It is extremely
doubtful that any "right" exists to enforce less stringent
requirements based on a state's view of the relative importance
of pollution control and other goals.
The Act provides for federal "best technology" guidelines
applicable to all existing sources,'1 9 federal standards of performance applicable to all new sources, 180 federal water-qualityrelated effluent limitations applicable to all sources designated
by the EPA,18 ' and federal toxic pollutant and pretreatment effluent standards applicable to all sources.' 82 Federal supervision
also pervades the national permit system. A state must meet EPA
requirements 18 3 before it may begin reviewing permit applications,' 8 4 all permits issued by a state are subject to an unqualified EPA veto power, 85 and a state's entire permit-issuing
18 6
authority may be withdrawn by the EPA on ninety days' notice.
Moreover, applicable federal standards shape the terms of state
permits to a great extent.
Act since its passage in 1948, "each successive amendment of the Act has enlarged the
degree of federal authority." Zener, supra note 16, at 738.
176 See 118 CoNG. REc. 10662 (1972) (remarks of Representative Reuss), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 577; cf., e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 29,
at 8, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 1426; Letter from the Adminis-

trator of the EPA, William D. Ruckelshaus to the Office of Management and Budget,
Oct. 11, 1972, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 143, 156.
177 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b) (Supp. IV,
1974). 8
17 Id. § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. IV, 1974).
1
79Id. § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
ISO1d. § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV, 1974).
181
Id. § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. IV, 1974).
182 .Id. § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. IV, 1974).
183 Pursuant to § 304(h) of the Act, the EPA has issued regulations defining, the
elements necessary to a state permit program. These regulations are set out at 40
C.F.R. §§ 124.1-.94 (1975).
184 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. IV,
1974). 5
8 1d. § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
18
'.Id. § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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A principal value intended to be furthered by extensive federal power was uniformity. The conferees sought "to assure that
similar point sources with similar characteristics, regardless of
their location or the nature of the water into which the discharge
is made, will meet similar effluent limitations."'' 1 7 The Conference
Report states plainly that apart from the section 301(c) variance
procedure applicable for 1983, "the intent of the Conferees is
that effluent limitations applicable to individual point sources
within a given category be as uniform as possible."'"" In short,
the Act's allocation of power was based largely on functional
89
considerations.1
2.

The Effect of a Rejection of the EPA's Interpretation
of Its Power Under Section 301(b)
If in the absence of rulemaking power under section 301(b)
the EPA were able to enforce national effluent standards by
alternative means concededly within the agency's power, recognition of the EPA's asserted authority to issue effluent limitations
under section 301(b) would be clearly consistent with the intended allocation of state and federal power under the Act.' 90
Therefore, this Comment will now consider what form EPA effluent controls might take were the courts to reject the EPA's
interpretation of its power under section 30 1(b). The inquiry will
focus on section 304(b), which requires the Administrator to
issue "guidelines for effluent limitations." With respect to both
the 1977 and 1983 phases, these guidelines must (1) identify for
each category the effluent reduction attainable through the use
of the statutorily defined technology, 191 and (2) specify the factors to be considered in determining the control technology to be
required for any given point source within the category.' 92 Attention will center also on the permit process. For if the EPA
187

CONFERENCE

REPORT,

supra note 36, at 126, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY,

supra188note 29, at 309.

Id.

189Zener, supra note 16, at 738.
190Of course, even if the EPA could not establish effluent limitations by means
other than § 301(b), Congress may have intended that the federal government have the
greater degree of power that § 301(b) would confer. Because the statutory language is
ambiguous and the legislative history is unclear, however, an affirmative intent to allocate greater power to the federal government through § 301(b) is difficult to demonstrate.
191 Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 304(b)(1)(A),
(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1314(b)(1)(A),
(b)(2)(A)
(Supp.
IV,
1974).
92
1 1d. §§ 304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV,
1974).
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were without power under section 30 1(b) to issue effluent limitations, the limitations mandated by that section would have to be
"achieved" through the permit process.
a. Effluent Limitations in States Lacking EPA-Approved
State Permit Programs
The EPA presently administers the national permit system
in twenty-three states that lack approved state permit programs. 1 93 A determination that the EPA is without authority to
issue section 301(b) effluent limitations would have no effect on
its authority to prescribe permit conditions for point sources in
these states. Sections 402(a)(1) and 402(a)(2) of the Act require
the Administrator to establish permit conditions that will ensure
that the discharge from a facility will meet "all applicable requirements under sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, and 403 of
this Act ....",1 If the EPA interprets section 301(b) to require
that, absent unusual circumstances, existing point sources must
adopt the "best practicable control technology currently available" by July 1, 1977, then EPA permit grantors may establish as
a permit condition the achievement of effluent limitations that
require the use of such technology.
Section 301(b) seems also to require that permit grantors
consider the "factors" specified in the EPA's section 304(b)
guidelines, and an EPA permit condition that could not be justified with reference to such factors might well be set aside by a
court of appeals.' 95 The factors that would appear in the EPA's
categorical guidelines, however, would of necessity tend to be
general in nature, and the EPA would almost certainly be able to
impose uniform permit conditions substantively identical to the
restrictions contained in the present effluent limitations guidelines. In short, the rejection of the EPA's asserted section 301(b)
authority would not impair the EPA's ability to establish uniform
effluent limitations for point sources in those states that lack
approved state permit programs.

193 See generally id. § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). For a list of the
states that administer EPA-approved permit programs, see note 64 supra.
194 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
195Section 509(a)(1)(F) of the Act confers on the courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review "the Administrator's action .. .in issuing or denying any permit under section
402 .... Id. § 1369 (b)(1)(F). Permit conditions that could not be justified on the basis
of the § 304(b) factors would be subject to challenge as "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an
abuse of discretion" under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1970).
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Effluent Limitations in States Having EPA-Approved
State Permit Programs
It is far more difficult to assess the consequences in those
states that directly administer the national permit system of a
denial of the EPA's asserted section 301(b) power. How the EPA
would structure its section 304(b) guidelines and how vigorous
an enforcement campaign it would wage are important considerations. The probable response of the courts should interested
parties challenge the EPA's approach is also significant. Each of
these considerations raises highly speculative questions, however,
and only some of the possibilities can be examined here.

b.

Range versus Fixed-Value Guidelines
To begin with, would the EPA issue section 304(b) guidelines that establish fixed values for the effluent reduction "attainable" through the application of the 1977 or 1983 technology, or
would it issue guidelines that contain ranges of values for the
effluent reduction attainable through the use of the required
technology in dissimilar plants? The present effluent limitations
guidelines contain only fixed-value limitations, and several dischargers have challenged the EPA's approach on the ground
that the section 304(b) guidelines must provide the permit grantor with ranges of values from which to choose. 1 96 It is significant that such challenges were successful both in the Third
Circuit, 9 ' which in all other respects upheld the EPA's interpretation of its power under section 301(b), and in a district court in
the Eighth Circuit, 198 where the court of appeals previously had
rejected the EPA's position.' 99
The district court objected to the present regulations because "the permit issuing authority will be working with no
clearly defined methodology in determining the application of
the appropriate technology for each plant. ' 20 0 If the permit
grantor were to have only fixed-value guidelines issued by the
EPA and no putative "effluent limitations" to consult, this problem would remain. One would expect that the courts, once having concluded that Congress intended the permit grantor to es(i)

"96

See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1045-47 (3d Cir.
1975).97
1 Id. Contra, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1465, at 22 (10th Cir.,
Aug. 11, 1976).
198Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96, 102-06 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
199CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
200 Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96, 104 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
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tablish the section 301(b) effluent limitations based on the EPA's
guidelines, would become more protective of the grantor's discretion and would compel the EPA to contribute to the intelligent exercise of that discretion. On the other hand, there is no
explicit statutory requirement that the guidelines provide a
range, 20 1 and the legislative history of the Act establishes only
that the Senate Public Works Committee in drafting its original
bill intended that the EPA establish such a range.2 °2
Moreover, even in the absence of ranges of values, the permit grantor's discretion will be informed by the section 304(b)
"factors," which must be specified in the guidelines.20 3 This requirement has been largely ignored in the litigation over the
EPA's power to issue effluent limitations,20 4 but if the EPA's asserted section 301(b) power were rejected, one would expect
dischargers to rely on this requirement in challenging the section
304(b) guidelines.
(ii) Variance Provisions
Assuming that the EPA's guidelines would specify the section 304(b) factors, and perhaps also provide a range of effluent
reduction values, would the guidelines also include "variances"?
Each effluent limitations guideline issued presently by the EPA
contains a uniform provision that the operator of any point
source in the subcategory may submit evidence to the permit
grantor "that factors relating to the equipment or facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such
discharger are fundamentally different from the factors considered in the establishment of the guidelines. ' 20 5 When the
permit grantor finds such "fundamentally different" factors, it
must establish effluent limitations in the permit that are "either
20 6
more or less stringent than" those set in the EPA's regulations.
Finally, "[s]uch limitations [to be effective] must be approved by
201 See,

e.g., American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 63 (D.C. Cir.,

May 011,
1976).
2
2 See SENATE

REPORT,

supra note 29, at 50, reprinted in

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra

note 29, at 1468; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 124-26, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 29, at 307-09; 118 CONG. REc. 33696 (1972) (exhibit of Senator
Muskie), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 169-70.
203 See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044-47 (3d Cir. 1975);
Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96, 103-05 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
204 See, e.g., American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448-49 n.13 (7th Cir.
1975); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 38-41 (D.C. Cir., May 11,
1976). But see cases cited note 203 supra.
205E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 417.122 (1975).
206
Id.
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the Administrator," who may "approve or disapprove such limitations, specify other limitations, or initiate proceedings to revise
20 7
these regulations.
Although these variance provisions have been upheld recently by three courts of appeals, 20 8 the regulations in which they
appear were issued pursuant to section 301 as well as section
304. It is uncertain whether the EPA would include similar variance provisions in its section 304(b) guidelines if the section
301(b) issue were decided adversely to the EPA. The Seventh
Circuit considered this possibility and stated in dictum that
EPA could perhaps include minimum effluent limitations in the guidelines and place the burden on the
applicant of justifying a higher effluent limitation. In
effect, the applicant would be required to apply for a
variance from the standard set by the guideline. A similar regulation could be established to govern EPA approval of state-issued permits. A strong argument, at
least, could be made for the validity of this approach
under § 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a), which gives EPA
the power to make "such regulations as are necessary to
carry out" its functions. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L. Ed. 1081
(1956); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 157 U.S.
App. D.C. 83, 482 F.2d 672, 692 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 951, 94 S.Ct. 1475, 39 L. Ed.2d 567 (1974).209
One argument against such variance regulations is that they are
not necessary to the Administrator's function of establishing section 304(b) guidelines, and it is hard to see how they are necessary to any of his other functions.
A further question is how rigorous a standard the EPA
could incorporate into any variance regulations. One court suggested that the "fundamentally different factors" standard, when
applied in conjunction with the EPA's present effluent limitations guidelines, impermissibly curtails the permit grantor's discretion because "it permits deviations from otherwise rigid and
207

Id.

208 American Paper Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1480 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 6, 1976); Natural
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 74-1258 (2d Cir., Apr. 28, 1976); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 (4th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 3165 (1976). But see Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, No. 74-2096 (4th Cir., July 16,
1976), modified, No. 74-2096 (4th Cir., Aug. 31, 1976).
209 American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 449 n.14 (7th Cir. 1975).
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unitary limitations" only in exceptional cases.2 10 On this view, the
"fundamentally different factors" standard might be acceptable
either if an EPA guideline provided a range of values from
which the permit grantor could select the effluent limitation applicable to an individual point source, or if the Administrator
selectively vetoed state permits so as to establish informally a
range within which the permit grantor might deviate from the
fixed-value guideline without being required to justify its action
under the variance regulations.
Under the former approach, the Administrator might establish a range of effluent reduction values the least restrictive of
which would be equivalent to the limitation contained in a current EPA effluent limitations guideline. A guideline of this format might be challenged on the ground that even the least restrictive value in the range falls near the upper limit of feasible
effluent reduction (as is evident from the value's relation to the
limitation in the current regulation), thus impermissibly confining the permit grantor's discretion. This argument is unsound
for two reasons. First, the Senate Report stated that the guidelines
were to establish ranges of values, to be determined by computing the average reduction achieved by the best performers using
the 1977 technology in plants of varying ages, sizes, and processes.21' As the Senate Report is the principal evidence that
Congress intended each EPA guideline to contain a range of
values, 21 2 a court that held that a range is required would probably give great weight to the Senate's view of how that range was
to be calculated and would reject any restriction on the EPA's
authority to execute the task in that manner. Moreover, even if a
court were to hold that a range is not required and that the
Senate Report carries little weight because the EPA need not establish a range, section 304(b) itself instructs the Administrator to
issue guidelines identifying the effluent reduction that is "attainable" through the use of the 1977 technology. For its current
effluent limitations guidelines, the EPA has determined the "attainable" effluent reduction by computing the average of the
best existing performance by a variety of plants within each industrial subcategory.2 13 Were this figure made the least restrictive value within a permissible range, the permit grantor could in
210American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975).
211 SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 50, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra

note 238,
12 at 1468.
See authority cited note 202 supra & accompanying text.
2 13
E.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 6580 (1974); see Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train,
No. 74-1687, at 6719 (2d Cir., Apr. 28, 1976).
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its discretion require that dischargers exceed the average of the
best existing performance of plants within the appropriate industrial subcategory. The argument that the lower limit (the
least restrictive value) of the range sets a reduction value that,
although "attainable," is "too high" is without support in the
statutory language. In short, the EPA probably could establish a
range of effluent reduction values, the least restrictive of which
effectively imposes the same limitation as the corresponding present EPA regulation.
On the other hand, whether the EPA could issue fixed-value
guidelines and include variance provisions that require "fundamentally different factors" whenever permits incorporate lower
effluent reduction levels than those set out in the guidelines, is
open to serious question. The EPA might take the position that
by specifying the factors considered by the EPA in establishing
the guidelines and then requiring "fundamentally different factors" to justify any deviation from that level, the EPA would be
in compliance with the statutory requirement that it specify factors to be taken into account in determining the control technology that any given point source must adopt. This approach represents the EPA's current practice; the courts rejecting the EPA's
position on its section 301(b) power would surely not allow the
EPA to retain that power simply by changing the name of its
regulations to "section 304(b) guidelines."
(iii)

Veto Power and Suspension Power
A different question would be presented if a permit applicant sought judicial review, apart from any challenge to the
guidelines, of the EPA's veto of a permit that required less effluent reduction than did the EPA's fixed-value guidelines although the plant did not qualify for a variance under those
guidelines. Presumably the EPA would be justified under section
402(d)(2) in vetoing the permit as "outside the guidelines and
requirements of this Act. ' 21 4 Although the meaning of the term
"guidelines" in this context is not free from doubt, Senator
Muskie described the Conference agreement as authorizing the
EPA to veto a permit "which does not conform to the guidelines
issued under section 304."215 Any claim that the veto power as
21" See CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 n.I 1 (8th Cir. 1975).
215 118 CONG. REc. 33698 (1972) (exhibit of Senator Muskie), reprinted in LEIiS-

LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 176. It is possible that Senator Muskie was referring
to § 304(h) guidelines for state permit programs. Cf. 118 CONG. REc. 33761 (1972)
(remarks of Representative Wright), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at
261. See generally note 183 supra.
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outlined here impinges on state discretion necessarily assumes
the existence of state discretion to impede the achievement of
the technology-based limitations set out in section 30 1(b). In fact,
if it appeared that a state consistently failed to adhere to the
section 304(b) guidelines, suspension of that state's permit2 16
issuing authority would be an appropriate procedure.
Practical considerations, however, limit the EPA's use of
both the veto power and the suspension power. If the veto
power is to be applied consistently, all permits issued by twentyseven state agencies must be reviewed within ninety days 217 for
compliance with the applicable guidelines. This approach would
require the exclusive attention of a large number of EPA personnel. If the EPA were to suspend a state's authority to issue
permits, the EPA would then have to administer the permit
program for that state, which would involve a careful study of
each point source to ensure that an appropriate permit would be
formulated for each discharger. The EPA thus has an incentive
to achieve a relationship with the state agencies that does not
require regular use of the EPA's full legal authority.
(iv) Summary and Comparison of the EPA's Ability to Establish
Effluent Limitations Under the Two Views of Section 301(b)
In short, the EPA's ability directly to establish uniform discharge levels for point sources in a given category would be diminished slightly were the EPA unable to issue limitations under
section 301(b). If the EPA chose to issue fixed-value guidelines,
it would probably be required to incorporate variance provisions more flexible than the present ones. 2 18 Alternatively, the
EPA might successfully establish guidelines that set out ranges
of effluent reduction values with the minimum effluent reduction values equivalent to the standards embodied presently in
the effluent limitations guidelines, 21 9 particularly if some variance provision were retained. The prediction offered by the
District of Columbia Circuit that the rejection of the EPA's asserted section 301(b) power "would effectively emasculate the
Act" 220 overlooks this interpretation as well as the EPA's veto
216 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp.
IV, 1974).
2 17
Id. § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
211 Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 74-1258, at 6755 (2d Cir.
Apr. 28, 1976).
219 See generally American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044-47 (3d
Cir. 1975).
220 American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464, at 36 (D.C. Cir., May 11,
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power. For reasons that already have been considered, however,
use of the veto power as a routine enforcement measure is impractical. Another significant practical difficulty with reliance on
section 304(b) guidelines is that the EPA would be required to
litigate the validity of its guidelines as dischargers seeking permit
modifications challenged the legitimacy of the regulations on
which the permits were based. Apart from practical considerations, however, the EPA would be able to achieve substantially
what it has achieved under the prevailing interpretation of section 30 1(b).
21
Under the EPA's current effluent limitations guidelines1
and the Act itself, several constraints are imposed upon permit
grantors. First, the EPA has power to veto any permit that is
"outside the guidelines and requirements" of the Act;2 22 inas-

much as the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines define the requirements of section 301(b) of the Act, noncompliance with
these regulations presumably would justify a veto.22 3 Second, the
EPA is empowered to veto any permit that fails to comply with
other federal standards such as water-quality-related effluent
limitations or toxic pollutant discharge standards.2 2 4 Finally, the
1976). In a recent decision, the Eighth Circuit termed this prediction "a distortion of
reality." CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, No. 74-1448, at 3 n.1 (8th Cir., Aug. 18, 1976).
221 Apparently the EPA intended originally to issue § 304(b) guidelines first and
subsequently to issue § 301(b) effluent limitations. See American Frozen Food Inst. v.
Train, No. 74-1464, at 40 n.6 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976). Section 304, however, required
that the guidelines be issued within one year from the effective date of the Act. The
Fourth Circuit observed in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 (4th
Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976):
The Administrator did not act within the one year requirements of § 304.
Compliance was not within the realm of reality. There are some 28,000 industrial dischargers and 27,000 others. About 30,000 applications for permits were
filed. EPA characterizes the Act as "incredibly complex and demanding." A
private suit was brought to compel compliance. The result was a court imposed
timetable. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, D.C. Cir., 510
F.2d 692, 710-714.
Id. at 7-8. Acting in compliance with the court's order, the EPA issued "effluent limitations guidelines" for hundreds of industrial subcategories in an effort to save time. E.g.,
40 C.F.R. § 417.122 (1975). See also American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464,
at 40 (D.C. Cir., May 11, 1976). Each guideline establishes a maximum daily level and a
maximum 30-day average daily level of discharge by weight of specified pollutants.
222 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402(d)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
223 The Act plainly contemplates, for example, that all new source permits comply
with the § 306 standards of performance although the standards are contained in EPA
regulations. Id. § 402(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Whether the EPA could veto a permit as simply "outside the guidelines" of the Act
is unclear. For a discussion of the meaning of "guidelines" in this context, see notes
214-15
supra & accompanying text.
224
1d. § 402(d)(2)(B) 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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EPA's requirement that a showing of "fundamentally different
factors" be made before a "variance" will be considered 2 25 limits
the permit grantor's discretion considerably.
When the two interpretations of section 301(b) are compared, it becomes clear that little significant difference exists
between them concerning the balance of state and national
power. The EPA has the power to establish de facto minimum
effluent limitations through the use of section 304(b) guidelines
even if it lacks the power to issue section 301(b) effluent limitations. The EPA's power to require that all permits comply with
other applicable federal standards, such as toxic pollutant discharge standards, is unquestioned on either view of section
301(b). Although the EPA's interpretation of the Act allows the
agency to limit variances from its effluent limitations guidelines
to exceptional cases, the same result could be achieved through
the use of a range of effluent reduction values coupled with a
similar variance provision. Furthermore, one significant state
prerogative-the privilege of establishing under state law effluent limitations as strict as or stricter than those defined by
section 301(b)-is secured by section 510, and is not affected by
the nature of the EPA's section 301(b) authority. It therefore
cannot be said that recognition of the EPA's power under section
301(b) to issue national effluent limitations would disturb the
Act's intended allocation of power between the state and national
governments.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has examined the arguments for and against
the EPA's asserted section 301(b) power to issue effluent limitations. Under the test set out by the Supreme Court in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Train,2 26 the EPA's interpretation of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act should be upheld if it is
"sufficiently reasonable." In view of the weakness of the Eighth
Circuit's arguments against the EPA's asserted section 301(b)
power, the absence from the Act of provisions that conflict with
the view that the EPA has such power, and the incomplete and
inconclusive legislative history, the question is a close one. Because the question is close on these counts, because the balance
of state and national power is nearly identical under both interpretations of the Act, and in light of the practical problems
225
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40 C.F.R. § 417.122 (1975); see text accompanying notes 205-07supra.
421 U.S. 60 (1975); see text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
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that would complicate the EPA's task were its asserted power
denied, the EPA's interpretation of the Act is "sufficiently
reasonable" and should be upheld.

